Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient result? But with reference to schools, the effect of the legal wrong proved most difficult to correct. Siqueland 116117. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. And in each city, the school boards plans have evolved over time in ways that progressively diminish the plans use of explicit race-conscious criteria. 05915, at 159, 147. 2, p. 83 (It [South Carolina] is confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality for all of its children of whatever race or color. The Court emphasized that education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 347 U. S., at 493. See id., at 152 (opinion of Stewart, J.). Strict scrutiny is not strict in theory, but fatal in fact. . See, e.g., Milliken, supra, at 746. Id. 1 L. Kohn, Priority Shift: The Fate of Mandatory Busing for School Desegregation in Seattle and the Nation 2730, 32 (Mar. But its conclusion is short: The plans before us satisfy the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. 05915, at 81; McFarland I, supra, at 842. 05908, 426 F.3d 1162; No. in No. The districts point to dicta in a prior opinion in which the Court suggested that, while not constitutionally mandated, it would be constitutionally permissible for a school district to seek racially balanced schools as a matter of educational policy. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Justice Breyers dissenting opinion, on the other hand, rests on what in my respectful submission is a misuse and mistaken interpretation of our precedents. See, e.g., Henderson, Greenberg, Schneider, Uribe, & Verdugo, High Quality Schooling for African American Students, in Beyond Desegregation 166 (M. Shujaa ed. Lower state and federal courts had considered the matter settled and uncontroversial even before this Court decided Swann. 264, 399400 (1821) (Marshall, C. In order for its plan to be constitutional under strict scrutiny, the School District must show its use of race in the admission process was furthering a compelling government interest (compelling interest) and that the School District plan was the narrowest possible use of race that could achieve this interest (narrowly tailored). Justice Breyer also tries to downplay the impact of the racial assignments by stating that in Seattle students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria). Post, at 46. App. of Ed. Thus about 2,000 students out of a total district population of about 60,000 students were involved in one or the other transfer program. Transfer plans, for example, allowed students to shift from a school in which they were in the racial majority to a school in which they would be in a racial minority. Despite his argument that these cases should be evaluated under a standard of review that is not strict in the traditional sense of that word, post, at 36, Justice Breyer still purports to apply strict scrutiny to these cases. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). That Swanns legal statement should find such broad acceptance is not surprising. of Oral Arg. [29] The districts have also failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Similarly, Jefferson Countys use of racial classifications has only a minimal effect on the assignment of students. Cf. The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. Grutter, supra, at 353 (opinion of Thomas, J.). In 1972, civil rights groups and parents, claiming unconstitutional segregation, sued the Louisville Board of Education in federal court. That view understands the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial exclusion. v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 413 (1977); Dayton Bd. But segregation policies did not simply tell schoolchildren where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin, ante, at 40 (plurality opinion); they perpetuated a caste system rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination. One commentator, reviewing dozens of studies of the educational benefits of desegregated schooling, found that the studies have provided remarkably consistent results, showing that: (1) black students educational achievement is improved in integrated schools as compared to racially isolated schools, (2) black students educational achievement is improved in integrated classes, and (3) the earlier that black students are removed from racial isolation, the better their educational outcomes. Brief for Respondent at 1617. Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should be subject to less exacting scrutiny. It also contends that racial diversity is too amorphous and uncertain a concept to be considered a compelling interest, and finally disputes as inconclusive the Districts statistics regarding the increased success rates of students in integrated schools. App. . in McFarland I, at 190 (Dec. 8, 2003) (Q. at 11 and Brief of Historians of the Civil Rights Era William H. Chafe, Davison Douglas, Charles Payne, Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Kenneth Mack, Risa Goluboff, Kevin Kruse and Matt Lassiter as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 23. gation without court orders); Branton, Little Rock I quote the Illinois Supreme Court at length to illustrate the prevailing legal assumption at the time Swann was decided. The plurality pays inadequate attention to this law, to past opinions rationales, their language, and the contexts in which they arise. Specifically, Kennedy finds that the districts could have achieved the same goal through less racially charged means. SCHOOLS, PETITIONER, on writ of certiorari to the united states court of The plan was in effect from 19992002, for three school years. With this explanation I concur in the judgment of the Court. Cf. of Los Angeles, 458 U. S. 527, 535536 (1982) ([S]tate courts of California continue to have an obligation under state law to order segregated school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. The Courts decision in Croson, supra, reinforced the difference between the remedies available to redress de facto and de jure discrimination: To accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for remedial relief for every disadvantaged group. In 2004, he ruled the same for the traditional schools, but allowed the regular public schools to use race as the admission requirement. Regardless, the plurality cannot object that the constitutional defect is the individualized use of race and simultaneously object that not enough account of individuals race has been taken. This exacting scrutiny has proven automatically fatal in most cases. This, in turn, could encourage policy-makers to be more accountable to families and implement policy that is innovative and responsive to local needs. in No. Franklin was integration positive because its nonwhite enrollment the previous school year was greater than 69 percent; 89 more white students were assigned to Franklin by operation of the racial tiebreaker in the 20002001 school year than otherwise would have been. Id., at 38a. 1986) (upholding rezoning plan under rational-basis review). The NAACPs Second Legal Challenge, 1977. It is the height of arrogance for Members of this Court to assert blindly that their motives are better than others. The Western District of Washington dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. Pp. 2. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. there are two compelling interests: 1. remedying the effect of past intentional discrimination 2. interest of student body diversity in higher education 1. 693, 227 N.E. 2d 729 (1967), appeal dismd, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam), post, at 35, is inapposite for the same reason that many of the cases cited by Justice Breyer are inapposite; the case involved a Massachusetts law that required school districts to avoid racial imbalance in schools but did not specify how to achieve this goaland certainly did not require express racial classifications as the means to do so. In light of this, the Seattle School District . In Grutter, the consideration of race was viewed as indispensable in more than tripling minority representation at the law schoolfrom 4 to 14.5 percent. 1 is an important case to educators, parents and students. School Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (CA4 1999); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809 (CA1 1998). Nor could it. There is ample precedent in the decisions of this Court to uphold school segregation); Brief for Petitioners in Gebhart v. Belton, O.T. 1952, No. Harvard Club of Washington, DC Upon realizing that the litigation would not be resolved in time for assignment decisions for the 20022003 school year, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion, 294 F.3d 1084 (2002) (Parents Involved III), vacated the injunction, and, pursuant to Wash. Rev. 2d 834, 837, 864 (WD Ky. 2004). of Los Angeles, 458 U. S. 527 (1982), post, at 24, in which a state referendum prohibiting a race-based assignment plan was challenged, is inappositein Crawford the Court again expressly reserved the question presented by these cases. We relied on the fact that Congress has continuously since 1862 segregated its schools in the District of Columbia); Brief for Appellees in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1952, No. 2005) (Parents IV). In reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement. Finally, it argues that race-neutral techniques, such as a lottery or taking into account many forms of diversity in a holistic approach, would be as effective as the racial tiebreaker. The memorandum of agreement between Seattle and OCR, of course, contains no admission by Seattle that such segregation ever existed or was ongoing at the time of the agreement, and simply reflects a desire to avoid the incovenience [sic] and expense of a formal OCR investigation, which OCR was obligated under law to initiate upon the filing of such a complaint. Swann addresses only a possible state objective; it says nothing of the permissible meansrace conscious or otherwisethat a school district might employ to achieve that objective. 05915, at 4, these ambiguities become all the more problematic in light of the contradictions and confusions that result. 2d, at 360. The long history of their efforts reveals the complexities and difficulties they have faced); post, at 21 (emphasizing the importance of local circumstances and encouraging different localities to try different solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to suit their individual needs (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); post, at 48 (emphasizing the school districts 40-year history during which both school districts have tried numerous approaches to achieve more integrated schools); post, at 63 ([T]he histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards). 1 App. 1, pp. It also cited to Justice Powells opinion in Bakke, approving of the limited use of race-conscious criteria in a university-admissions affirmative action case. See ante, at 1213. The school districts in these cases voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children may attend. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law). After ninth grade, students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria). Public Schools, 330 F.Supp. Revisited: Desegregation to Resegregation, 52 J. Negro Educ. 1314. Far from being narrowly tailored to its purposes, this system threatens to defeat its own ends, and the school district has provided no convincing explanation for its design. The term racial imbalance refers to a ratio between nonwhite and other students in public schools which is sharply out of balance with the racial composition of the society in which nonwhite children study, serve and work. Seattles racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students between schools. 2, pp. The first is the difference between de jure and de facto segregation; the second, the presumptive invalidity of a States use of racial classifications to differentiate its treatment of individuals. [Footnote 13]. PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1 Id. The principal interest advanced in these cases to justify the use of race-based criteria goes by various names. 05908, at 103a. 1991). They were further persuaded that these plans differed from other race-based programs this Court has considered because they are certainly more benign than laws that favor or disfavor one race, segregate by race, or create quotas for or against a racial group, Comfort, 418 F.3d, at 28 (Boudin, C.J., concurring), and they are far from the original evils at which the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed, id., at 29; 426 F.3d, at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring). In the case Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. See Board of Ed. 05915, at 37 (Each [Jefferson County] school has a designated geographic attendance area, which is called the resides area of the school[, and each] such school is the resides school for those students whose parents or guardians residence address is within the schools geographic attendance area); id., at 82 (All elementary students shall be assigned to the school which serves the area in which they reside); and Brief for Respondents in No. 2d 257 (2003) (quoting [***38] Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 65 L. Ed. [Footnote 8]. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993), an injury that the members of Parents Involved can validly claim on behalf of their children. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Seattle case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. For the reasons explained above, the records in these cases do not demonstrate that either school boards plan is supported by an interest in remedying past discrimination. Second, in Croson, the Court appeared willing to authorize a government unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible. They are based upon numerous sources, which for ease of exposition I have cataloged, along with their corresponding citations, at Appendix B, infra. Roberts (Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIC), joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, Roberts (Parts IIIB and IV), joined by Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg. . This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half-century ago. The Seattle School Board challenged the constitutionality of the initiative. Thus, in North Carolina Bd. Then-Justice Rehnquist, in denying emergency relief, stressed that equitable consideration[s] counseled against preliminary relief. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 05908, at19. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. The Seattle school board itself must believe that racial mixing is not necessary to black achievement. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U. S. 237, 249250 (1991); Green v. School Bd. See also Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, The techniques that different districts have employed range from voluntary transfer programs to mandatory reassignment. Id., at 21. Strict scrutiny of race-based government decisionmaking is more searching than Chevron-style administrative review for reasonableness. Justice Kennedy sets forth two additional concerns related to narrow tailoring. In respect to Louisville, he says first that officials stated (1) that kindergarten assignments are not subject to the race-conscious guidelines, and (2) that the child at issue here was denied permission to attend the kindergarten he wanted because of those guidelines. 1, 50 (2002) (describing President Carters support for affirmation action). Other problems are evident in Seattles system, but there is no need to address them now. During and just after World War II, significant numbers of black Americans began to make Seattle their home. While diversity may lend to a robust education, parents and students have their own opinions on what factors promote the best education possible. Swann, 402 U. S., at 16. 4 Id., at 1516; Memorandum from Stephen W. Daeschner, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. Justice Breyers dissent next relies heavily on dicta from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. PDF Affirmative Action and Diversity in Public Education: Legal Developments 10266aa(b)(2) (2007). Several factors, taken together, nonetheless lead me to conclude that the boards use of race-conscious criteria in these plans passes even the strictest tailoring test. Since the Court granted writ over these objections, it seems likely that it will find jurisdiction exists. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion). It provided that each elementary school would have a black student population of between 15% and 50%; each middle and high school would have a black population and a white population that fell within a range, the boundaries of which were set at 15% above and 15% below the general student population percentages in the county at that grade level. As a consequence, this separate opinion is necessary to set forth my conclusions in the two cases before the Court. We granted certiorari. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971) (The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole), and here Jefferson County has already been found to have eliminated the vestiges of its prior segregated school system. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. The broad interest in racial diversity in education generally could potentially filter through all facets of the school, and even into elementary education. Segregation is not the only possible explanation for a racial imbalance, and there may be no educational benefit from diversity that is artificially created. When the actual racial breakdown is considered, enrolling students without regard to their race yields a substantially diverse student body under any definition of diversity. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971) (emphasis added). First, Kennedy harshly faults the dissent for consciously ignoring the difference between de jure and de facto segregation. 4143 (Mar. In a footnote the Justice added a personal mention of Justice Breyer: "Justice Breyer's good intentions, which I do not doubt, have the shelf life of Justice Breyer's tenure. in No. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressly stated: The racial imbalance act requires the school committee of every municipality annually to submit statistics showing the percentage of nonwhite pupils in all public schools and in each school. Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 2021. Like the University of Michigan undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz, 539 U. S., at 275, the plans here do not provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants but instead rely on racial classifications in a nonindividualized, mechanical way. of Boston v. Board of Ed., 352 Mass. ; see also post, at 61. No. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 507 (1989); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) See, e.g., Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280, n.14; Freeman, 503 U. S., at 495496 (Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications). Hampton, 102 F.Supp. See also ante, at 1517 (Thomas, J., concurring). It set forth its view prominently in an important opinion joined by all nine Justices, knowing that it would be read and followed throughout the Nation. So, the argument proceeds, if race is the problem, then perhaps race is the solution. And I have explained how the plans before us are more narrowly tailored than those in Grutter. Some have concluded that black students receive genuine educational benefits. A (listing Statutory and Consti- Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and 05908, at 30a. Brief for Petitioner at 11. [Footnote 12] Each school district argues that educational and broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse learning environment, and each contends that because the diversity they seek is racial diversitynot the broader diversity at issue in Grutterit makes sense to promote that interest directly by relying on race alone. In the districts public schools approximately 41 percent of enrolled students are white; the remaining 59 percent, comprising all other racial groups, are classified by Seattle for assignment purposes as nonwhite. [Footnote 16]. I concur in the Chief Justices opinion so holding. Without it, some schools such as Cleveland and Ranier would have remained substantially dominated by minorities, while minority students were denied the opportunity to attend the popular schools outside their neighborhoods. 1 (2007), the Supreme Court ruled this plan unconstitutional under the 14th amendment. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle (2007), the United States Supreme Court found that the school district was using race in an unconstitutional manner in its assignment plan. 89. See also Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring); Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. . 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., July 30, 1975) (1975 Judgment and Findings). The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general societal discrimination, ante, at 23 (plurality opinion), but of primary and secondary school segregation, see supra, at 7, 14; it includes an effort to create school environments that provide better educational opportunities for all children; it includes an effort to help create citizens better prepared to know, to understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of democratic government our Constitution foresees.